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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1ST OK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MORRIS H. CURTIS and SADIE 
P. CURTIS, his wife; and UTAH 
TITLE & ABSTRACT CO., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
No. 14334 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The Plaintiff brought an action to specifically enforce 
the terms of a Uniform Real Estate Contract. Defendants Curtis 
counterclaimed, asking that the contract be rescinded because 
of the fraudulent representations and the fraud practiced upon 
them by the President of the Plaintiff Corporation. Defendant 
Utah Title and Abstract Company agreed to be bound by the order 
of the Court regardless of the outcome respecting the other 
parties and no other affirmative relief xvas asked against it. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. The jury entered a general 
verdict and special interrogatories in favor of. the Defendants 
Curtis and thereafter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment was entered by the Court in favor of Defendants Curtis 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants Curtis seek to have affirmed the verdict 
of the jury and the judgment of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We do not disagree with the summary statement: of 
facts of appellant. However, we believe the facts must 
be supplemented to give the Court a basic understanding 
of the matter. 
BUSINESS EXPERIENCE AND BACKGROUND OF DEFENDANTS CURTIS 
Defendant Morris H. Curtis was a farmer (TR335) 
who supplemented his income as a delivery truck driver 
for Premium Oil Company (TR336). He had very limited 
business experience and had never had the services of 
a lawyer (TR336). He had never had a real estate trans-
action where he was the seller (TR336). When he purchased 
his farm property, the transaction was handled by a Sevier 
County Abstracter whom he thought to be the Sevier County 
Recorder (TR337). He was never acquainted with any real 
estate broker (TR337). He does not know how to read real 
estate descriptions or how to compute acreage (TR343). 
Sadie P. Curtis, wife of the Defendant Morris H. 
Curtis, had little formal education. She finished the 
ninth grade and then was forced to leave school because 
of critical injury. She was in a coma for a period of 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
six months and then was blind and paralized for two 
years (TR413). She had no business experience. When 
she and her husband acquired a lot for the purpose of 
building their home, they exchanged a house trailer for 
it and the seller, her husband's uncle, took care of the 
property transfer (TR414). The farm purchase was handled 
by a Richfield Abstracter (TR414). She didn't know any 
lawyers or any real estate brokers (TR414). Mrs. Curtis 
has health problems which place severe limitations on 
her ability to transact business. She has a heart problem 
and high blood pressure. Tension or pressure or excitement 
cause a complete loss of memory. In her words, "I just 
don't remember. I just blank." (TR415). 
NEED FOR ASSISTANCE AND PRELIMINARY INDUCEMENTS BY BUYER 
The Curtises own 250 acres of land in Salina Canyon 
which was bisected by Interstate Highway 170 and upon 
which the Salina Freeway Exchange is now built (TR337). 
Prior to roadway construction, the Curtises were aware 
of the freeway activity and had seen surveyors on their 
property (TR338). They were aware of many problems in 
developing freeway frontage and knew they were not able 
to cope with them without assistance. The Curtises knew 
that they "were going to have to have some help*to 
disburse of our property11 (TR338) . They knew their 
property was valuable but had no idea as to the extent 
- 3 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of its value (TR338). Orland Fiandaca, President of 
the Plaintiff 1st Ok Corporation, first contacted the 
Curtises in December of 1971 or early January 1972. 
The exact time is in some dispute. He spent over 
five hours (TR334) telling the Curtises of the 
problems in highway development and of his experience 
and ability to develop highway property (TR431). He 
said his services would make them financially . 
independent. Curtises would be able to get a 
condominium in Hawaii and wouldn't have to work the 
rest of their lives (TR391 and TR417). Fiandaca 
informed Curtises that he was well acquainted with 
the Governor of the State of Utah and the State Road 
Engineer and was in close contact with them and could 
get whatever easements were needed to develop all of 
the Curtis property (TR342). It was at this time 
Curtises decided, "This is our man, a man who could 
help us with the disbursing of our property" (TR341). 
Fiandaca presented to Curtises an arrangement by 
which Curtises agreed to grant to 1st Ok Corporation 
an option for $100.00 which would allow 1st Ok Corp-
oration to acquire 50 acres of land for $1,000.00 per 
acre. The option was on the express condition that 
Fiandaca would represent Curtises and develop their 
remaining property so that it could be sold (TR391) . 
Curtises would not have sold the land for the price 
A 
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mentioned without the additional consideration (TR341), 
ORIGINAL CONTRACT PREPARED BY BUYER 
Fiandaca then wrote the option agreement in his 
own hand which tied up 50 acres of property for a 
period of one year for $100.00 consideration, Mr, 
Curtis suggested going to a lawyer, but Fiandaca 
told him he had bad experience with lawyers and 
that he was capable of drawing up a contract, 
Fiandaca also informed Curtises that he had a title 
and trust company that would handle the matter for 
them (TR342 and 343). Mr. and Mrs. Curtis understood 
the title company "would be protectors" (TR343)f 
SECOND CONTRACT PREPARED BY BUYER 
After the initial option prepared by Fiandaca 
was executed in December of 1971 or early January, 
1972, Mr, Fiandaca came back to the Curtises on or 
about January 21, 1972 and informed them that the 
State Highway was going to condemn approximately 38 
acres of land he had under option, Fiandaca informed 
them that this left him only about 12 acres to develop 
and that he wasn't in a position to represent them in 
developing their property unless additional land was 
added to his contract for his benefit. Curtises then 
agreed to add an additional 20 acres to the option 
agreement (TR345). A discussion was had concerning the 
- 5 - :••"•'• 
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purchase price (TR391), It was agreed that the 
price would be $65,000.00 for the original 50 acres 
plus 20 acres or a total of 70 acres. However, 
Fiandaca wrote the new contract to include 90 acres 
rather than 70 acres (TR224, 345, 346, 354, 368, 419 
and 421). Because of the dependency the Curtises had 
on Fiandaca for services he was going to render, the 
Curtises agreed to a price of $65,000.00 for the 70 
acres (TR346 and 347). Fiandaca then wrote the option 
contract and the real estate description (TR346 and 352; 
Exhibit 41). 
ADDENDUM TO SECOND CONTRACT 
At a later date Fiandaca contacted the Curtises 
and said he had heard that they were not satisfied with 
the $65,000.00 purchase price. The Curtises informed him 
that they were not satisfied because they felt they should 
have $1,000.00 per acre for the land in the option agree-
ment. Thereafter, the option contract was amended by an 
addendum to include an additional $5,000.00 for a total 
purchase price of $70,000.00 (TR352 and 353). Curtises 
were never aware of the fact that the contract (Exhibit 
41) included 90 acres of their land until the time of 
pre-trial (TR367 and 368) , The Curtises would not have 
signed the agreement if they had known 90 acres of their 
land was described (TR368). After the second preliminary 
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contract of January 21, 1972 (Exhibit 41) was 
prepared by Fiandaca in his own hand, it was 
signed by all of the parties, Thereafter 
Fiandaca exercised his option and a uniform 
real estate contract and trust agreement were 
completed (Exhibits 41a and 42) and the Curtises 
conveyed their property to Utah Title and Abstract 
Company on January 3, 1973 (TR359 and 360), The 
Curtises were paid the down payment less the $100,00 
option consideration which was returned to Fiandaca 
as a credit on the payment (Exhibit 43)r 
MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTY RETAINED BY SELLERS 
After receiving the down payment on the property, 
the Curtises had frequent contact with Fiandaca in 
which he kept them informed on what he was doing to 
"manage'* their property (TR347) , Mr. FiandacaTs next 
payment under the contract was due January 3, 1973, 
Fiandaca contacted the Curtises and requested an 
extension of time for payment. The Curtises refused 
to grant the extension since they were negotiating to 
buy other grazing property for their cattle (TR362 and 
363), The payment was not made. The Curtises waited 
thirty (30) days and then contacted an attorney'for 
the first time. A notice of default was given pursuant 
to the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract and no 
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payment was made within the grace period (TR363, 
364 and 365)< After notice of default and demand 
for reconveyance (Exhibit 80) was given to Fiandaca 
and the Utah Title and Abstract Company, the Utah 
Title and Abstract Company refused to reconvey to 
the Curtises but at the request of Fiandaca conveyed 
all of the Curtis road frontage property to 1st Ok 
Corporation without prior notice to Curtises (TR312, 
313 and 314). 
FACTS DISCOVERED BY DEFENDANTS CURTIS AFTER DEFAULT 
IN FIRST SCHEDULED PAYMENT 
Thereafter, the Curtises learned the following 
facts which were never previously disclosed: 
(a) Orland Fiandaca had not described 70 
acres of their property in the option contract which 
he had prepared (Exhibit 41), but had inserted a 
description for 90 acres (TR224, 345, 346, 354, 368, 
419 and 421). 
(b) Orland Fiandaca had secured the release 
of a tract of the Curtis land on December 15, 1972 
and prior to execution of the uniform real estate 
agreement and had sold the property for approximately 
$20,000.00. Only $10,000.00 of which was delivered 
to the Curtises as the down payment (TR360). 
(c) The release of that initial tract of land 
landlocked property owned by Curtises to the South (TR361). 
- 8 -
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(d) Fiandaca had taken out personal bank-
ruptcy which bankruptcy proceedings were closed in 
October, 1971 (TR254) a few months prior to negoti-
ations and entering into the option agreement with 
Curtises (TR194). 
(e) Orland Fiandaca had previously operated 
a corporation known as the Container Corporation which 
had become bankrupt (TR193), 
(f) The 1st Ok Corporation was organized and 
the only contribution to capital was $1,000.00 and a 
part of the $1,000.00 was used for organization 
expenses (TR200).. 
(g) The 1st Ok Corporation had lost its charter 
for failure to file reports and returns required by the 
State of Utah (TR190, Exhibit 84), 
(h) Fiandaca did not properly represent the 
Curtises in negotiations with the Utah State R.oad 
Commission or \<j±th other agencies and did not reserve 
private easements which could be used to service the 
remaining property retained by Curtises; specifically; 
(1) Fiandaca obtained from the State Road 
Commission access openings of 50 feet for property 
acquired by him under the purchase agreement. The 
accesses granted to Curtises for other property owned 
by them and fronting on the access road were only 16 
feet in width.(TR349), 
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(2) Curtises' property remained zoned 
agricultural while Fiandaca procured a zone change for 
his property to highway commercial (TR361 and 148). 
(3) Under the lot release provisions in 
the Fiandaca contract a selection was made of the entire 
land which fronted on the highway and landlocked the 
balance of the property owned by Curtises, See Exhibit 
88 (TR222). 
(4) Fiandaca borrowed funds for his own 
benefit on the Curtis property and executed two mort-
gages on Curtis land (TR233 and 368). 
(5) Fiandaca sold options on parcels of 
the property being acquired from Curtises and did 
receive cash option consideration in excess of 
$6,000.00 while he made no attempt to assist with 
sales or marketing of the remaining Curtis property 
(TR369 and 370). 
(6) Fiandaca had negotiated with the 
Utah State Road Commission and secured a payment 
of $500.00 per acre on the land in which he had an 
interest and identical land which was retained by the 
Curtises was condemned and the Curtises were paid 
$200.00 per acre (TR350 and 351), 
Upon learning the true facts, the Curtises 
counterclaimed against the 1st Ok Corporation to 
rescind the contract because of the fraud practiced 
in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
ON THE ISSUE OF CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP: 
1. THE ISSUE WAS RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS. 
2. THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED DURING TRIAL 
REQUIRED THE INSTRUCTIONS TO BE GIVEN. 
1. THE ISSUE OF CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS 
RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS. 
Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
states the requirement for pleading as follows: 
n(a) CLAIMS FOR RELIEF. A pleading which 
sets forth a claim for relief, whether an 
original claim, cross-claim or third-party 
claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a 
demand for judgment for the relief to which 
he deems himself entitled.,f 
The foregoing rule has been reviewed by this Court 
on several occasions. In Burr vs. Child,! Utah 2d 199, 265 
p. 2d 383 the Court wrote: 
"Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
for the most part taken from the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, (28 USCA) a 
pleader is required only to make a short 
and plain statement of his claim, U.R.C.P. 
Rule 8(a), and the requirement of technical 
exactness is excluded. Fine detail is not 
required. Porter v. Shoemaker, D.C., p. 51. . In 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 388, 
91 L.Ed. 451, Mr. Justice Murphy, discussing 
the Federal rules, said: 
- 11 — 
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"The pre-trial deposition-discovery 
mechanism established by Rules 26 to 
37 is one of the most significant 
innovations of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Under the prior 
federal practice, the pre-trial 
functions of notice-giving, issue-
formulation and fact-revelation were 
performed primarily and inadequately 
by the pleadings. Inquiry into the 
issues and the facts before trial was 
narrowly confined and was often 
cumbersome in method. The new rules, 
however, restrict the pleadings to the 
task of general notice-giving and invest 
the deposition-discovery process with a 
vital role in the preparation for trial." 
This court also considered pleading requirements in 
t h e c a s e o f Wilson vs. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759. A t 
issue was the question of whether malice had been alleged 
in connection with the request for punitive damage. 
Justice Crockett wrote for the Court: 
"Particularly under our new Rules of Civil 
Procedure (Rule 8A U.R.C.P.) a statement of 
ultimate fact is sufficient and it is un-
necessary to set forth in detail the conduct, 
the language or the artifices used to accom-
plish the result." 
The legal term "confidential relationship" or 
"trust" or "fiduciary" or "trustee" or "constructive 
trustee" are all words describing a legal conclusion 
or a legal relationship which result from a certain 
state of facts and from which certain legal rights 
and obligations result. This matter is covered in 
American Jurisprudence 2d. §8 pleading in Volume 61 Am Jur 2d. 
on page 460, w i t h t h e fo l lowing s t a t e m e n t : 
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"It is unnecessary to plead presumptions 
of law, inferences, or facts necessarily 
implied from other facts stated. A plead-
ing which avers facts from which the law 
presumes another fact sufficiently pleads 
that other fact. What is clearly implied 
is as much a part of the pleading as what 
is expressed. Like a presumption of law, 
an inference need not be pleaded.11 
Defendants Curtis in paragraph four of their counter-
claim stated: 
"That the 1st Ok Corporation, a Utah Corp-
oration, by and through its President, 
Orland Fiandaca, falsely made the following 
representations to induce Defendants to 
enter into said contracts and the Defendants 
reasonably relying thereon did enter into 
said contract, which misrepresentations 
were: 
(a) Orland Fiandaca, President of the 
1st Ok Corporation did represent that his 
company was a corporation under the laws 
of the State of Utah and was therefore a 
good buyer, financially sound and able to 
guarantee all of the performances and 
payments due under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract dated the 15th day of December, 
1972. 
The 1st Ok Corporation has no assets 
with which to guarantee payment or per-
formance of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract identified and as a matter of 
fact has made sales of parcels of 
Plaintiff's property in advance for the 
purpose of securing payments due. 
(b) That Orland Fiandaca, President of 1st 
Ok Corporation informed the Defendants that they 
should not go to an attorney, that attorneys were 
expensive and the Defendants would be properly 
secured by the contract which was drafted in 
accordance with his instruction and further 
that he would take the Defendants to 
Utah Title and Abstract Company, 
specialists in real property matters 
- 13 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
who would make certain that the 
Defendants were adequately secured 
and would suffer no financial injury 
or damage. Upon the inducement so 
made, these Defendants did execute 
the Trust Agreement attached to 
Plaintiff's Complaint marked Exhibit 
"B" and did convey their property to 
Defendant, Utah Title and Abstract 
Company; that Utah Title and Abstract 
Company did not undertake to represent 
these Defendants or to secure them from 
economic or financial loss; that in fact 
they only administered the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract already prepared by the 
Plaintiff which agreement permits a 
substantial reduction in the value of 
Plaintiff's security because property can 
be selected at random by Plaintiff and 
sold to third parties and the limited 
proceeds required to be paid for partial 
releases are applied on accruing pay-
ments due under the contract; therefore, 
Plaintiff selects valuable parcels of 
land and has said parcels conveyed to 
said third parties and do thereby 
substantially decrease Plaintiff's 
security interest. 
( c ) Orland Fiandaca, President of Plaintiff 
Corporation did represent to these Defendants that 
he was an expert in developing commercial property 
and that he would effectively negotiate with the 
State of Utah and all other interested persons to 
make certain that adjoining property retained by 
these Defendants would be substantially increased 
in value; that he would see that the State of Utah 
granted suitable access rights to a proposed inter-
state highway so that Defendants1 adjoining properties 
could be developed for commercial purposes. 
That P l a i n t i f f has not represented these 
Defendants in said negot ia t ions in any manner 
or attempted to secure access r i g h t s or 
attempted to a s s i s t these Defendants in p lan-
ning t h e i r property for commercial development. 
( d ) That Plaintiff through its President did 
further represent that it would reserve adequate 
easements and access rights to and from the inter-
state highway for the benefit of Defendants' adjacent 
property. 
1L -
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That no attempt has been made to 
reserve easements and rights-of-way 
for Defendantsf benefit. 
(e) Orland Fiandaca, President of Plaintiff 
corporation did further represent to the Defendants 
that he would reserve for their benefit all gas, 
oil and mineral rights. 
That in fact, the Plaintiff did cause 
the Defendants to convey all of their gas, 
oil and mineral rights to the trustee and 
it further executed instruments conveying 
gas, oil and mineral rights to third parties 
who have purchased parcels of property from 
the Plaintiff by reason of the lot release 
provisions contained in Exhibit "A". 
Each of the foregoing allegations demonstrate that 
Orland Fiandaca did hold himself out to be an expert in 
drafting legal documents, planning and managing freeway 
properties and in dealing with real estate; that Defendants 
Curtis did rely upon him completely to draft a legal 
instrument and make such arrangements as would accomplish 
their purposes of security, property management and for 
development of their property and sale to third parties. 
The Plaintiff was instructed by the Court to prepare a 
pre-trial order (TR3). He did not finalize the order. 
Therefore, the Defendants Curtis submitted a pre-trial 
order (R45 through 47) prior to the trial in which the 
issues submitted to the jury were specifically* set out 
as follows; 
"5. The following are the issues of fact 
to be tried: 
(a) Did Plaintiff's President, Orland 
Fiandaca, induce Defendants Morris H, Curtis 
and Sadie P. Curtis into entering into the 
agreement to sell their property by false 
representations, and if so, what were those 
false representations? Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(b) Did Fiandaca and his corporation 
or either of them hold themselves out as 
being capable of performing and willing to 
perform and, in fact, undertake and agree 
to furnish professional and expert services 
and advice in evaluating, classifying, 
zoning, obtaining accesses for, marketing, 
determining the accurate amount of acreage 
of, offering for sale and selling real 
property for commercial development and 
whether or not Curtises in reliance upon 
that representation and in reliance upon 
Fiandaca or his corporation holding them-
selves out as willing and able to perform 
those services relied thereupon in execution 
of the several contracts and Fiandaca and his 
corporation, having undertaken to do those 
things and furnish that advice and services 
failed to do so and thereby damaged Curtises, 
(c) Did a confidential relationship 
exist between Orland Fiandaca, President 
of 1st Ok Corporation and Morris H. Curtis 
and Sadie P. Curtis? 
(d) When was the payment due from 
Plaintiff on January 5, 1974, made to 
Defendants, Morris H. Curtis and Sadie 
P. Curtis or their agent? . . * 
6. The following are issues of law to be 
decided by the court: 
(a) Have Defendants Morris H. Curtis 
and Sadie P. Curtis waived any deficiences 
in the time and manner of payment of the 
payment due from Plaintiff on January 5, 1974? 
(b) Does Plaintiff have an adequate 
remedy at law, and is it entitled to specific 
performance? — » 
(c) Are Defendants Morris H, Curtis and 
Sadie P. Curtis entitled to have their contract 
with Plaintiff rescinded because of the fraud-
ulent inducement of Plaintiff? 
(d) Did a confidential relationship exist 
between Orland Fiandaca, President of 1st Ok 
corporation and Morris H. Curtis and Sadie P. 
- 16 -
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Curtis and are the Curtises entitled 
to have their contract with Plaintiff 
rescinded because of a breech of 
fiduciary trust by the Plaintiff? 
(e) Are Defendants Morris H. Curtis 
and Sadie P. Curtis entitled to forfeit 
the interest of Plaintiff in the real 
property being purchased, or would such 
forfeiture be unconscionable? 
7. Issues of fact will be submitted to the 
jury by special interrogatories and gen-
eral verdict form. Counsel for Plaintiff 
and Defendants Curtis will submit their 
proposed special interrogatories to the 
Court before 10:00 A.M. on the morning of 
trial." 
The pre-trial order, instructions, special jury 
interrogatories and general jury verdict forms were 
all submitted to the court and to counsel for the Plaintiff 
prior to 10:00 A.M. on the morning of the commencement of 
trial. Each of the instruments detailed the Defendants1 
theory of the case. Plaintiff did not request a continuance 
and did elect to proceed to trial. 
2. THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED DURING TRIAL REQUIRED 
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO BE GIVEN. 
We respectfully submit that the relationship between 
the parties was set out by the facts pleaded in the 
Defendants Curtis Counterclaim and also specifically 
set out in the pre-trial order and the'request for 
instructions and in the special jury interrogatories 
and general jury verdict forms submitted prior to trial. 
However, we are of the opinion that even if the pleadings 
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had not covered the specific relationship of the 
parties the facts in evidence at trial did in fact 
prove a confidential relationship. Under this 
circumstance, the Court was required to submit 
instructions to advise the jury on the burden 
of proof on the issue of fraud.. 
This Court covered this question in considerable 
detail in the case Of In Re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 
293 P. 2d 682: 
"Where a confidential adviser is made 
the beneficiary in a will, receives 
gifts or possible benefits from trans-
actions with the person who relies on 
his advice and counsel on such matter 
in the making or execution of which he 
actively participates, a presumption 
of fraud and undue influence arises, 
which shifts the burden of persuading 
the trier of fact that there was no 
fraud or undue influence." 
This Court also stated: 
"For reasons previously pointed out we 
also reject the doctrine that this pre-
sumption is eliminated by a prima facie 
showing to the contrary. After careful 
study and consideration we conclude that 
this presumption shifts the burden onto 
the confidential adviser of persuading 
or convincing the fact finder by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that no fraud 
or undue influence was exerted, or in 
other words, he had the burden of con-
vincing the fact finder from the evidence 
that it is more probable that he acted 
perfectly fair with his confidant; thatr 
me made complete disclosure of all mat-
erial information available and took no 
unfair advantage of his superior position.1' 
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In Johnson vs. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 the 
Court stated: 
"In assaying the sufficiency of proof, the 
plaintiffs here have significant help in 
the rule that when a confidential relation-
ship is shown to exist and a gift or con-
veyance is made to a party in a superior 
position, a presumption arises that the 
transaction was unfair.^ This presumption 
has the force of evidence and will itself 
support a finding if not overcome by 
countervailing evidence. Therefore, the 
burden was upon the defendant Calvin 
Johnson to convince the court by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the 
transaction was fair.^ if he failed to 
do so, the finding to the contrary was 
justified, and it will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless the contrary evidence 
was so clear and persuasive that all 
reasonable minds would so find. 
There can be no doubt that the existence 
of a confidential relationship here of the 
very kind for which the above rule was 
fashioned. The evidence shows that his 
father reposed great confidence in Calvin. 
This is epitomized by his cooperating with 
him in making final arrangements about his 
property for the eventuality of death/1 
In the case of Omega Investment Co. vs. Woolley, 72 
u. 474, 271 P. 797, this Court said: 
uThe confidential relation being shown 
to exist, the burden devolved upon Woolley 
to show that, in the making of the trans-
action, the fullest and fairest explanation 
and communication was made to Baldwin of 
every particular in Woolleyfs breast; that 
•Omega Investment Co. vs. Woolley, 72 Utah 474, 271 P. 797, 
quoting 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec, 956. 
'•In Re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d 682. 
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the transaction itself was fair, and the 
consideration paid therefor adequate, before 
a court is justified in permitting the trans-
action to stand,'1 
The facts proved at the time of trial required the 
Court to sumbit to the jury the issue of whether or. not. 
there was a confidential relationship. In the event the 
jury found a confidential relationship did exist, the 
Court was further required to instruct specifically 
concerning the burden of proof required to be assumed by 
the respective parties. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS CURTIS DID ALLEGE AND DID PROVE THE 
ELEMENTS OF ACTIONABLE FRAUD. 
D e f e n d a n t s C u r t i s d i d a l l e g e t h e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s 
of a c t u a l f r a u d a s s p e c i f i c a l l y s e t f o r t h i n t h e U t a h Case 
of Pace vs. Parrish, 122 u. 141
 f 247 p.2d 273, The allegations are 
contained in Defendants Counterclaim and in an amendment 
authorized by the Court and included In the pre-trial 
order. The Plaintiff acknowledges the additional specific 
claim of the Defendants Curtis which is in paragraph 2 
of the pre-trial order (R.45): 
"2. The Counterclaim of Defendants Morris 
H. Curtis and Sadie P. Curtis is hereby 
amended to show the date of execution of 
the instruments described therein as Jan-
u a r y 3 , 1973 and further amended to show that 
Defendants allege Plaintiff represented the property 
described in the contract of January 21, 1972 included 
70 acres of Curtis land which representation v/as false 
since the property described consisted of approximately 
90 acres." 
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The appellant made certain the jury fully under-
stood the burden of proof upon Defendants Curtis in 
connection with their allegation of common law fraud. 
In addition to having the Court instruct specifically 
thereon in Instruction No. 17 (R.79), the Plaintiff 
did have the Court submit the following Special 
Interrogatory No. 5 (R.86) which was Plaintiff's 
requested Instruction No. 1: 
"We the jury, find from a preponderance 
of the evidence in this case the following 
answers to the questions propounded to us: 
(a) Prior to entering into the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract whereby Plaintiff pur-
chased real property from Defendants Morris 
H. Curtis and Sadie P. Curtis, did Orland 
Fiandaca, President of Plaintiff corporation, 
make any representations concerning then 
presently existing material facts? 
ANSWER: YES 
If the answer to the previous question is 
yes, answer questions B through F. 
(b) Were said representations false: 
ANSWER: YES 
(c) Did Orland Fiandaca, at the time of 
such representations, know them to be false 
or make them recklessly, knowing that he had 




•••'.'(d) Were such representations made'for 
the purpose of inducing Morris H. Curtis and 
Sadie P. Curtis to act upon them? 
ANSWER: YES 
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(e) Did Defendants Morris H. Curtis 
and Sadie P. Curtis, acting reasonably, 
and in ignorance of the falsity of such 
representations, in fact rely upon them? 
ANSWER; YES 
(f) Were Defendants Morris H. Curtis 
and Sadie P. Curtis thereby induced to act 
to their injury or damage? 
ANSWER: YES 
Setting aside the consideration of the existing 
confidential relationship and other acts of fraud, 
the jury found a specific fraudulent representation 
by Fiandaca which would be controlling. 
The first option agreement prepared by Fiandaca 
was torn up and rescinded by the parties on January 
21, 1972 (TR346). A second option (Ex.41) was prepared 
by Fiandaca in his own hand on the same day (TR346). 
He secured the signatures of the Curtises by representing 
the real property description contained 70 acres and the 
price was set on that basis. The description did in fact 
contain 90 acres. 
The jury considered the matter under Interrogatory 
No. 4 (R.85): 
11
 INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Do you find from 
the evidence that on or before January 
21, 1972 Mr. Fiandaca sought and obtained 
an amendment to the previous agreement 
between the parties by which amendment * 
he obtained or would have obtained rights 
in an additional 40 acres of land owned 
by Mr. and Mrs. Curtis while failing to 
disclose that fact or while representing 
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to Defendants or allowing them to believe 
Mr. Fiandaca was obtaining rights in only 
an additional 20 acres of land?" 
The jury answered "yes". 
CONCLUSION 
We submit the trial court did not error in instruct-
ing the jury concerning common law fraud or instructing 
the jury separately concerning a confidential relationship. 
The jury correctly found that common law fraud was 
practiced upon the Curtises and did further correctly 
find that a confidential relationship existed between 
Orland Fiandaca, President of the 1st Ok Corporation, 
and the Defendants Curtis and that Fiandaca breeched 
the confidence imposed in him under that relationship. 
We respectfully submit the general verdict and special 
interrogatories of the jury and the findings of fact, 
conclusions of lax? and judgment of the court should be 
affirmed. 
Respec t fu l l y submi t t ed , 
TEX R. OLSEN 
01 sen and Chamberlain 
76 South Main 
R i c h f i e l d , Utah 84701 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
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